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Abstract:	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  cast	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  alternative	  between	  skilled,	  
time-­‐intensive	   and	   unskilled	   activities	   within	   an	   analytical	   framework	   wherein	   the	  
individuals'	   choice	   problem	   is	   addressed	   in	   terms	   of	   alternative	   time-­‐consuming	  
activities	   rather	   than	   alternative	   bundles	   of	   goods	   and	   services.	   In	   particular,	   each	  
activity	   is	   interpreted	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   productive	   process	   allowing	   pleasant	   time	   to	   be	  
produced	   by	   consuming	   'direct'	   unpleasant	   time	   plus	   the	   'indirect'	   amount	   of	  
unpleasant	  time	  equivalent	  to	  the	  market	  goods	  used	  up	  as	  inputs.	  The	  paper	  suggests	  
that	   individuals	   might	   refrain	   from	   engaging	   in	   skilled,	   time-­‐consuming	   activities	  
because	   of	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   a	   certain,	   higher	   present-­‐period	   rate	   of	   return	   of	  
unskilled	   activities	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   a	   possibly	   higher	   future-­‐period	  
rate	  of	  return	  obtainable	  through	  engagement	  in	  (more	  roundabout)	  skilled	  activities.	  
	  
	  




The	   timeless	  metaphor	   of	   the	   standard	   consumption	   theory	   in	   Economics	   takes	   for	  
granted	  that	  individuals	  focus	  their	  attention	  on	  the	  ‘utility’	  of	  the	  available	  goods	  and	  
services	   that	   are	   seen	   as	   the	   direct	   source	   of	   their	   satisfaction.	   Within	   such	   a	  
metaphor,	  there	  is	  no	  room	  either	  for	  the	  prologue	  or	  for	  the	  finale	  of	  this	  story,	  i.e.	  on	  
the	  one	  hand	  for	  the	  motivations	  lying	  behind	  our	  choices	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  for	  
what	   happens	   after	   goods	   and	   services	   have	   been	   bought.	   In	   fact,	   one	   essential	  
ingredient	   of	   the	   metaphor	   provides	   individuals	   with	   the	   power	   to	   anticipate	   and	  
‘extract	  utility’	  in	  the	  same	  moment	  in	  which	  they	  get	  what	  they	  have	  chosen,	  though	  
only	  in	  probabilistic	  terms.	  1	  
Somehow	   paradoxically,	   the	   seminal	   contribution	   by	   Gossen	   (1983	   [1854])	   to	   the	  
subjective	  theory	  of	  demand,	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  (decreasing)	  marginal	  utility,	  does	  
consider	  time,	  and	  hence	  both	  the	  duration	  and	  the	  frequency	  of	  consumption,	  as	  an	  
essential	   aspect	   of	   the	   choice	   problem	   faced	   by	   individuals.	   However,	   in	   the	  
subsequent	  developments	  of	  the	  marginalist	  theory,	  the	  path	  indicated	  by	  Gossen	  was	  
abandoned	   and	   the	   timeless	   model	   finally	   emerged	   as	   the	   reference	   point	   for	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  standard	  demand	  theory.	  
A	  first	  attempt	  to	  widen	  the	  focus	  of	  standard	  theory	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Becker	  (1965),	  
wherein	   households	   are	   viewed	   as	   production	   units	   that	   use	   what	   they	   got	   on	   the	  
marketplace,	  together	  with	  their	  time,	  as	  inputs	  of	  a	  process	  whose	  output	  is,	  in	  turn,	  a	  
bundle	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  Actually,	  in	  Becker’s	  approach,	  consumption	  time	  shows	  
up	  in	  the	  scene	  to	  disappear,	  however,	  once	  the	  time-­‐consuming	  production	  process	  is	  
over	  and	  its	  output	  generates	  an	  instantaneous	  level	  of	  utility	  to	  the	  household.	  	  
A	  wholly	  different	  approach	  to	  consumption	  choices	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Tibor	  
Scitovsky,	   whose	   The	   Joyless	   Economy	   (1992	   [1976])	   constitutes	   one	   of	   the	   first	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  expected-­‐utility	  version	  of	  the	  standard	  theory.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  ‘people-­‐
know-­‐what-­‐they-­‐want’	   axiom	   is	   particularly	   striking	   in	   the	   intertemporal	   version	   of	   the	   general	  
equilibrium	   theory,	  where	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   a	   given	  utility	   function	  and	   income	   streams	   for	   all	   possible	  
future	  periods,	  individuals	  choose	  ‘in	  one	  shot’	  the	  best	  bundles	  for	  all	  possible	  states	  of	  the	  world	  and	  
all	  future	  periods.	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attempts	  to	  tell	  a	  comprehensive	  story	  about	  human	  satisfaction,	  covering	  what	  comes	  
both	   before	   and	   after	   the	   individual’s	   decision	   to	   buy	   goods	   and	   services	   in	   the	  
marketplace.	  	  
As	   to	  what	   comes	   before,	   Scitovsky	   felt	   the	   need	   to	   investigate	   about	   ‘motivations’	  
driving	  economic	  choices,	  thus	  paving	  the	  way	  to	  a	  fruitful	  cross-­‐fertilization	  between	  
economics	  and	  psychology:	  
“Economists	   know	   a	   lot	   about	   what	   makes	   producers	   tick,	   while	   they	   know	  
almost	  nothing	  about	  the	  motivation	  of	  consumers.	  Surely,	  knowledge	  of	  what	  makes	  
consumers	  tick	  is	  just	  as	  important	  as	  knowledge	  of	  the	  way	  producers	  make	  decisions.	  
Probing	  into	  consumer	  behavior	  and	  its	  motivation	  should	  give	  economists	  …	  a	  better	  
judgment	   of	   how	   well	   the	   economy	   performs	   …	   Although	   economists	   have	   never	  
analyzed	  the	  nature	  and	  origin	  of	  consumer	  preferences,	  others	  have,	  so	  we	  need	  not	  
start	  from	  scratch.	  Psychologists	  have	  done	  a	   lot	  of	  work	  on	  the	  motivation	  of	  man’s	  
behavior,	  of	  which	  consumer	  behavior	  is	  part	  (Scitovsky,	  1992,	  p.4).	  
As	   to	   what	   comes	   after	   consumers’	   act	   of	   acquiring	   goods	   and	   services,	   Scitovsky’s	  
approach	   is	   firmly	  grounded	  on	   the	   idea	   that	  human	  satisfaction	   is	  generated	  within	  
time-­‐consuming	   activities	   that,	   therefore,	   constitute	   the	   direct	   object	   of	   the	  
individual’s	  economic	  choices:	  
Civilization	  consists	  in	  originating	  stimulating	  activities	  other	  than	  violence	  and	  
back-­‐breaking	   labor,	   developing	   the	   skills	   needed	   to	   exercise	   and	   enjoy	   those	  
activities,	  …	  By	  now,	  the	  number	  and	  variety	  of	  enjoyable	  benign	  interests	  has	  become	  
enormous:	  they	  comprise	  scientific	  research,	  exploration,	  literature,	  art,	  sports,	  games	  
of	   skills	   and	   chance,	   and	   the	   offerings	   of	   the	   entertainment	   industry,	   among	  many	  
other	  things.	  We	  need	  them	  all,	  considering	  that	  scientific	  research	   in	  turn	   is	   forever	  
increasing	  our	  leisure	  …”	  (ibidem	  p.	  viii).	  
Moreover,	   Scitovsky	  emphasizes	   the	  distinction	  between	   skilled	  and	  unskilled	  
stimulating	  activities	  trying	  to	  analyze	  the	  main	  differences	  between	  the	  two:	  
“I	   have	   already	   mentioned	   some	   forms	   of	   stimulation	   whose	   enjoyment	  
requires	   virtually	   no	   skill	   and	   no	   effort	   on	   the	   recipient	   part;	   …	   The	   entertainment	  
industry	  provides	  much	  of	   it	  …	  Beyond	  a	   certain	  point,	   the	  amount	  of	   stimulus	   such	  
pastimes	   provide	   increases	   not	   with	   the	   amount	   of	   time	   the	   consumer	   devotes	   to	  
them	  …	  Without	  an	  increase	  in	  novelty	  content,	  more	  time	  spent	  watching	  television,	  
driving	  around	  or	  shopping	  merely	  spreads	  the	  novelty	  thinner,	  increases	  redundancy,	  
and	   reduces	   the	   intensity	   of	   enjoyment.	   What	   would	   be	   pleasant	   stimulation	   on	   a	  
moderate	  scale	  becomes,	  when	  pushed	  further,	   first	  mere	  defense	  against	  boredom,	  
and,	  ultimately	  just	  boredom.	  (ibidem,	  p.232).	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On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Scitovsky’s	   concern	   with	   skilled,	   time-­‐consuming	   activities	   has	  
been	  recurrently	  directed	  towards	  one	  of	  them	  in	  particular,	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  culture,	  
which	  he	  considered	  a	  sort	  of	  merit	  activity:	  
“Finally,	   I	   come	   to	   the	   third	   group,	   which	   comprises	   all	   those	   activities	   that	  
impose	  no	  burden	  ,	  no	  harm	  on	  anyone,	  but	  give	  satisfaction	  and	  pleasure	  all	  around	  …	  
Cultural	  activity	  also	  belongs	  in	  this	  exalted	  category	  …	  That	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  I	  called	  
culture	   a	   good	   thing.	   Another	   and	   no	   less	   important	   reason	   for	   calling	   it	   good,	  
however,	  is	  that	  some	  cultural	  activities	  are	  potentially	  able	  to	  crowd	  out	  some	  of	  the	  
antisocial	   activities	   listed	   in	   the	   second	   group.	   …	   if	   one	   activity	   (or	   set	   of	   activities)	  
satisfies	   one’s	   need	   for	   being	   active,	   the	   one’s	   need	   for	   other	   activities	   is	  
correspondingly	   diminished	   …The	   big	   question	   is	   how	   to	  motivate	   people	   to	   prefer	  
benign	  to	  malignant	  activities	  and	  make	  such	  choices	  on	  their	  own	  initiatives	  –	  how	  to	  
induce	  that	  ever	  larger	  segment	  of	  the	  population,	  which	  has	  more	  time	  and	  energy	  on	  
its	   hands	   than	   it	   knows	   how	   to	   use,	   to	   devote	   its	   excess	   time	   and	   energy	   to	  music,	  
painting,	  acting,	  sports	  …”	  (ibidem,	  pp.	  294-­‐6)	  
However,	   one	   should	   add	   that	   notwithstanding	   his	   acute	   emphasis	   on	   activities,	  
Scitovsky	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  convincing	  logical	  framework	  to	  approach	  the	  individual’s	  
choice	   problem	   taking	   into	   account	   that	   consumption	   takes	   time.	   Therefore,	   his	  
reiterated,	  normative,	  argument	  about	  individuals	  indulging	  in	  unskilled	  activities	  while	  
refraining	  from	  engaging	  in	  the	  more	  stimulating	  ones,	  such	  as	  culture,	  seems	  to	  lack	  a	  
sound	  positive	  basis.	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   cast	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   alternative	   between	   skilled	   and	  
unskilled	  activities	  within	  an	  analytical	  framework	  wherein	  time	  is	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  
stage.	  In	  fact,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  below,	  individuals	  will	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  producers	  of	  
pleasant	   time,	   an	   activity	   that	   requires	   undergoing	   some	   unpleasant	   time	   and	   the	  
consumption	  of	  a	  bundle	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  as	  inputs.	  Moreover,	  it	  will	  be	  assumed	  
that	  individuals	  can	  choose	  among	  alternative	  ‘techniques’	  (activities)	  varying	  not	  only	  
for	  their	  intrinsic	  nature	  (going	  to	  a	  movie	  theater	  or	  staying	  home	  reading	  a	  novel)	  but	  
also	  according	  to	  whether	  they	  require	  a	  more	  or	   less	   intensive	  consumption	  of	  time	  
or	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   (spending	   a	   week	   holydays	   walking	   around	   small	   villages	  
nearby	  home	  or	  taking	  a	  cruiser	  boat).	  	  
The	  analytical	  background	  of	  the	  proposed	  model	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  above	  mentioned	  
works	  of	  Gossen	  and,	  above	  all,	  of	  Becker	  who	  has	  rightly	  emphasized	  the	  need	  to	  take	  
into	  account	  that	  the	  allocation	  of	  time	  is	  part	  of	  the	  individual’s	  choice	  problem	  as	  it	  is	  
the	  allocation	  of	  money.	  However,	  contrary	  to	  Becker’s	  approach,	  in	  the	  ‘what-­‐shall-­‐I-­‐
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do’2	   framework	   here	   proposed	   not	   only	   the	   output	   of	   the	   households’	   productive	  
process	   is	   time,	   namely	   a	   flow	   of	   pleasant	   time,	   but	   also	   its	   inputs	   can,	   in	   turn,	   be	  
measured	  in	  terms	  of	  unpleasant	  time	  (Nisticò	  2010),	  so	  that	  each	  activity	  (productive	  
process)	   is	   characterized	   by	   a	   rate	   of	   return	   depending	   on	   the	   ratio	   between	   the	  
pleasant	   time	   produced	   and	   the	   unpleasant	   time	   used	   up	   during	   the	   process.	  
Scitovsky’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  limited	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  skilled	  (cultural)	  activities	  and	  
on	  their	  limited	  substitutability	  for	  the	  unskilled	  ones	  can	  thus	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  a	  sound	  theoretical	  framework.	  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   paper	   is	   the	   following.	   Section	   2	   summarizes	   Gossen’s	   and	  
Becker’s	   seminal	  approach	   to	   time	  use.	  The	  methodological	  and	  analytical	   structures	  
of	  the	  ‘what-­‐shall-­‐I-­‐do’	  model	  here	  proposed	  are	  described	  in	  sections	  3.	  Some	  general	  
implications	   of	   the	   choice	   to	   frame	   the	   individual	   decision-­‐making	   in	   terms	   of	  
alternative	  time-­‐consuming	  activities	  are	  discussed	  in	  section	  3	  and	  4.	  Finally,	  section	  5	  
discusses	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  cultural	  activities	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  possibility	  to	  
interpret	  them	  as	  investment	  projects,	  whose	  undertaking	  individuals	  might,	  rationally,	  
pass	   up	   given	   the	   fundamental	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   its	   outcome.	   Section	   6	  
concludes.	  
2 Gossen	  and	  Becker	  on	  time	  use	  
The	   individual	  decisions	   about	  how	   to	  allocate	   the	  marginal	   time	  unit	   among	  
alternative	   activities	   depends	   on	   the	   consequences,	   in	   terms	   of	   satisfaction,	   of	  
extending	   or	   cutting	   any	   of	   the	   chosen	   activities,	   and	   on	   the	   expected	   satisfaction	  
deriving	  from	  the	  possible	  alternatives.	  Imagine	  that	  you	  entered	  one	  of	  the	  museums	  
in	   town,	  with	  your	  next	  activity	   (such	  as	  going	   to	   the	  doctor	   for	  a	   routine	  check	  up)	  
being	  scheduled	  in	  two	  and	  half	  hours;	  and	  that	  after	  spending	  one	  hour	  to	  carefully	  
looking	   at	   the	  museum’s	   pieces	   of	   art,	   you	   realize	   that	   the	   output	   of	   your	   ongoing	  
activity	  is	  ceasing	  to	  be	  the	  uninterrupted	  enjoyment	  you	  experienced	  so	  far,	  and	  that	  
some	  kind	  of	  physical	  and	   intellectual	  distress	   is	  coming	  forward.	  You	  could	  envisage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  the	   juxtaposition	  between	  a	   ‘what	  shall	   I	  do’	  and	  a	   ‘what	  shall	   I	  buy’	   logical	   framework,	  
see	  Steedman	  (2001).	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alternative	  solutions	  to	  your	  time-­‐allocation	  problem.	  For	  instance	  you	  could	  ‘cut’	  the	  
ongoing	  process	  and	  switch	  to	  an	  alternative	  one,	  such	  as	  visiting	  the	  shopping	  center	  
on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  street,	  while	  postponing	  the	  visit	   to	  the	  remaining	  rooms	  of	  
the	  museums	  to	  one	  of	  the	  subsequent	  days.	  Alternatively,	  you	  could	  take	  a	  rest	  and	  
sit	  for	  a	  while	  in	  the	  museum’s	  cafeteria,	  drink	  a	  coffee	  and	  then	  go	  back	  to	  enjoy,	  with	  
renewed	  drive,	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  museum.	  	  
Whatever	   your	   choice	   will	   be,	   the	   example	   suggests	   that	   (i)	   the	   extension	  
through	   time	   of	   the	   same	   activity	   will,	   sooner	   or	   later,	   cause	   your	   ‘instantaneous’	  
satisfaction	   to	  decrease;	   (ii)	   the	   repetition	  of	   the	  same	  activity	  after	  a	   (long	  enough)	  
period	  of	  abstinence	  can	  restore	  the	  enjoyment	  productive	  capacity	  of	  that	  activity.	  
The	  link	  between	  human	  satisfaction	  and	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  individuals	  
engage	   in	   the	   same	   consumption	   activities,	   has	   been	   the	   basis	   upon	   which	   Gossen	  
(1854)	   has	   erected	   his	   seminal	   theory	   of	   consumer	   choice	   based	   on	   the	   notion	   of	  
decreasing	   marginal	   utility.	   The	   essence	   of	   Gossen’s	   contribution	   lies	   in	   his	   famous	  
‘laws	  of	  pleasure’:	  
A.1.	   The	   magnitude	   [intensity]	   of	   pleasure	   decreases	   continuously	   if	   we	  
continue	   to	   satisfy	  one	  and	   the	   same	  enjoyment	  without	   interruption	  until	   satiety	   is	  
ultimately	  reached.	  
A.2.	  A	  similar	  decrease	  of	  the	  magnitude	  [intensity]	  takes	  place	  if	  we	  repeat	  a	  
previously	  experienced	  pleasure.	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  initial	  magnitude	  [intensity]	  of	  the	  
pleasure	   become	   smaller,	   but	   also	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   pleasure	   shortens,	   so	   that	  
satiety	   is	   reached	  sooner.	  Moreover,	   the	  sooner	   the	   repetition,	   the	  smaller	   the	   initial	  
magnitude	   [intensity]	   and	   the	   shorter	   the	   duration.	   (Gossen,	   1983	   [1854],	   p.	   6,	  
emphasis	  added).	  
What	  is	  striking	  of	  Gossen’s	  analysis	  is	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  culture	  
as	  a	  typical	  instance	  of	  an	  activity	  subject	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  pleasure:	  
That	  repetition	  brings	  about	  an	  actual	  decrease	  of	  the	  peak	  of	  pleasure	  and	  a	  
shortening	   of	   the	   duration	   of	   enjoyment	   becomes	  more	   evident	  with	   the	   increased	  
frequency	   of	   repetition.	   The	   owner	   of	   a	  work	   of	   art,	   though	   he	   be	   the	   greatest	   art	  
enthusiast,	  will	  gradually	  become	  more	  and	  more	  indifferent	  to	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  that	  
piece	  of	  art.	  	  
Who	  does	  not	  remember	  the	  pleasure	  he	  has	  derived	  from	  the	  discovery	  ,	  real	  
or	   fancied,	  of	  a	  new	  truth!	  Subsequently,	   some	  pleasure	   is	  derived	   from	  dwelling	  on	  
the	  subject	  for	  a	  while;	  but	  this	  diminishes	  more	  and	  more	  until	  in	  the	  end	  any	  further	  
contemplation	  of	  the	  topic	  results	  in	  boredom.	  (Ibidem,	  p.7).	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Yet	   Gossen’s	   focus	   on	   how	   consumers	   can	   produce	   enjoyment	   through	  
sequences	   of	   time	   consuming	   activities	   has	   disappeared	   from	   the	   analytical	  
refinements	   of	   the	   subjective	   theory	   of	   value	   as	   it	   took	   shape	   in	   the	  works	   of,	   say,	  
Jevons,	   Menger	   and	   Walras,	   where	   the	   demand	   problem	   was	   ‘reduced’	   to,	   and	  
analyzed	   in	   terms	   of,	   instantaneous	   optimal	   choices	   of	   alternative	   bundles	   of	   goods	  
and	  services,	  with	  given	  preferences	  and	  constraints.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  time	  will	  later	  
show	  up	  in	  the	  intertemporal	  version	  of	  the	  general	  equilibrium	  theory	  developed	  by	  
Arrow	  and	  Debreu	  -­‐	  characterized	  as	  it	  is	  by	  the	  assumption	  that	  individuals	  maximize	  
‘once	  and	  for	  all’	  their	  total	  utility	  by	  knowing	  and	  discounting	  all	  the	  relevant	  future	  
variables	   -­‐	   does	   not	   overcome	   the	   limits	   of	   an	   analysis	   that	   neglects	   the	   fact	   that	  
‘extracting	  utility’	  from	  consuming	  goods	  and	  services	  takes	  time.	  
As	   mentioned	   above,	   it	   was	   only	   in	   1965	   that	   a	   prominent	   figure	   of	   the	  
neoclassical	  theory	  of	  choice	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  try	  to	  restore	  the	  fundamental	  role	  that	  
Gossen	  had	  originally	  attributed	  to	  time	  in	  consumption	  theory.	  In	  particular,	  the	  main	  
and	   declared	   aim	   of	   Becker’s	   1965	  work	  was	   to	   propose	   a	   revised	   theory	   of	   choice	  
capable	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  cost	  of	  non-­‐working	  time	  spent	  in	  consumption:	  	  
“…	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  service	  like	  the	  theatre	  or	  a	  good	  like	  meat	  is	  generally	  simply	  
said	  to	  equal	  their	  market	  prices,	  yet	  everyone	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  theatre	  and	  even	  
dining	   take	   time,	   just	   as	   schooling	   does,	   time	   that	   often	   could	   have	   been	   used	  
productively.	   If	   so,	   the	   full	   costs	   of	   these	   activities	   would	   equal	   the	   sum	   of	  market	  
prices	  and	  the	  forgone	  value	  of	  the	  time	  used	  up.	  In	  other	  words,	  indirect	  costs	  should	  
be	  treated	  on	  the	  same	  footing	  when	  discussing	  all	  non-­‐work	  uses	  of	  time,	  as	  they	  are	  
now	  in	  discussions	  of	  schooling	  …	  while,	  as	  already	  mentioned,	  I	  have	  been	  concerned	  
with	   the	  use	  of	   time	   in	   education,	   training	   and	  other	   kinds	  of	   human	   capital,	   here	   I	  
attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  general	  treatment	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  time	  in	  all	  other	  non-­‐work	  
activities.”	  (Becker	  1965,	  p.494).	  
More	  specifically,	  In	  Becker’s	  metaphor,	  “households	  are	  both	  producing	  units	  
and	  utility	  maximisers.	  They	  combine	  time	  and	  market	  goods	   [xi]	  via	   the	  "production	  
functions"	   fi	   to	   produce	   the	   basic	   commodities	   Zi,	   and	   they	   choose	   the	   best	  
combination	   of	   these	   commodities	   in	   the	   conventional	   way	   by	   maximising	   a	   utility	  
function	   U=	   U(Zi,	   ...	   Zm)	   =	   U(f1,	   ...	   .fm)	   =	   U(x1,	   ...	   xm;	   T1,	   ...	   Tm)	   subject	   to	   a	   budget	  
constraint	  g(Zi,	  ...	  Zm)	  …”	  (ibidem,	  p.	  496).	  
In	  a	  second	  step	  of	  his	  analysis,	  Becker	  introduces	  the	  notion	  of	  “full	  income”,	  
i.e.	  the	  income	  level	  that	  can	  “be	  obtained	  by	  devoting	  time	  and	  other	  resources	  of	  a	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household	   to	   earning	   income,	   with	   no	   regard	   for	   consumption”	   (pp.	   497-­‐8).	   This	  
potential	   income,	   a	   mixture	   of	   time	   and	   earnings,	   can	   partly	   be	   allocated	   to	  
consumption	  activities	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  increase	  the	  utility	  level:	  
Households	   in	  richer	  countries	  do,	  however,	  forfeit	  money	  income	  in	  order	  to	  
obtain	   additional	   utility,	   i.e.,	   they	   exchange	  money	   income	   for	   a	   greater	   amount	   of	  
psychic	   income.	   For	  example,	   they	  might	   increase	   their	   leisure	   time,	   take	  a	  pleasant	  
job	  in	  preference	  to	  a	  better-­‐paying	  unpleasant	  one,	  employ	  unproductive	  nephews	  or	  
eat	   more	   than	   is	   warranted	   by	   considerations	   of	   productivity.	   In	   these	   and	   other	  
situations	   the	   amount	   of	   money	   income	   forfeited	   measures	   the	   cost	   of	   obtaining	  
additional	   utility.	   Thus	   the	   full	   income	   approach	   provides	   a	   meaningful	   resource	  
constraint	  and	  one	  firmly	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  goods	  and	  time	  can	  be	  combined	  into	  
a	  single	  overall	  constraint	  because	  time	  can	  be	  converted	   into	  goods	  through	  money	  
income	  (ibidem,	  p.498)	  
3 A	  what	  shall	  I	  do	  framework3	  	  
If,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  income	  earned	  per	  unit	  of	  time	  is	  a	  good	  
measure	  of	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  enjoying	  one	  unit	  of	  our	  time,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
by	  giving	  a	   look	  at	   the	  other	   side	  of	   the	   coin	  one	   realizes	   that	   the	  pleasure	  possibly	  
deriving	  from	  enjoying	  one	  unit	  of	  our	  time	  is	  a	  good	  measure	  of	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  
of	   devoting	   one	   unit	   of	   our	   time	   to	   earn	   income.	   And	   since	   coins	   are	   neither	  
transparent	  nor	  necessarily	  symmetrical,	  looking	  at	  the	  other,	  yet	  unexplored,	  side	  of	  
the	  time-­‐earnings	  trade	  off	  could	  expand	  our	  comprehension	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  drive	  
individual	  consumption	  choices.	  In	  fact,	  Becker’s	  approach	  to	  treat	  market	  goods	  and	  
consumption	   time	   as	   inputs	   of	   a	   production	   process	   can	   be	   pursued	   not	   only,	   as	  
Becker	   himself	   did,	   by	   transforming	   consumption	   time	   into	   ‘foregone	   earnings’,	   but	  
also	  by	   taking	   the	  opposite	   stand,	  namely	  by	   transforming	   the	  monetary	   cost	  of	   the	  
market	  goods	  into	  a	  time	  flow	  to	  be	  added	  to	  consumption	  time.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  
in	   a	   what-­‐shall-­‐I-­‐do	   framework	   (Nisticò	   2010),	   the	   output	   of	   the	   households’	  
production	  function	  is	  pleasurable	  time	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  inputs	  of	  the	  Becker-­‐type	  
production	   processes	   are	   also	   transformed	   and	   computed	   in	   terms	   of	   (unpleasant)	  
time	  flows,	  while	  the	   ‘efficiency’	  of	  the	  household’s	  production	  process	  can	  be	  easily	  
measured	   by	   comparing	   two	   homogenous	   magnitudes	   -­‐	   precisely	   as	   it	   happens	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  frameworks,	  see	  Steedman	  (2001).	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firms,	  whose	  performance	  is	  measured	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  revenues	  and	  costs.	  
By	   assuming	   that	   that	   all	   individuals	   devote	   a	   given	   fraction	   of	   the	   reference	   time	  
period	  (a	  week)	  to	  work	  and	  that,	   in	  their	  perception,	  each	  ‘unit’	  of	  time	  flow	  can	  be	  
given	   either	   one	   of	   the	   two	   attributes,	   ‘pleasant’	   or	   ‘unpleasant’,	   the	   time-­‐based	  
efficiency	  of	  each	  activity	  depends	  merely	  on	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  shares	  of	  pleasant	  
and	   unpleasant	   time	   involved	   in	   that	   activity.	   More	   specifically,	   the	   analytical	  
framework	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows.	  
Contrary	   to	   Becker’s	   assumption	   that	   individuals	   derive	   their	   utility	   from	   the	  
‘instantaneous’	  consumption	  of	  the	  basic	  commodities	  Zi,	  the	  amount	  of	  pleasant	  time	  
enjoyed	  during	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  the	  js	  time-­‐consuming	  activities	  (j	  =	  1,	  2,	  …	  L)	  –	  the	  
L-­‐th	  being	  work	  -­‐	  	  is	  the	  direct	  source	  of	  individuals’	  satisfaction.	  	  
If	  one	  assumes	  that	  working	  time	  is	  wholly	  unpleasant,	  then	  the	  cost	  of	  activity	  











where	  the ijg s ( )1,...,i z=  represent	  the	  services	  of	  all	  market	  good	  is	  used	  up	  during	  
the	  activity j, im  their	  market	  price,	   w  the	   income	  earned	  per	  unit	  of	  working	   time	  
and	   jE the	   flow	  of	   unpleasant	   time	  necessary	   to	   perform	  activity J. Notice	   that	   the	  
ratio im w represents	  the	  amount	  of	  working	  time	  (supposedly	  unpleasant)	  necessary	  
to	  buy	  one	  unit	  of ijg . 
Since	   the	   output	   of	   each	   activity	   is	   also	  measured	   by	   a	   (pleasant)	   time	   flow,	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where	   T 	   denotes	   the	   length	   of	   the	   time	   period,	   I	   denotes	   the	   individual’s	   income	  
whose	   source	   is	   unrelated	   with	   working	   time,	   and	   ΔW the	   change	   in	   individual’s	  
wealth.	  According	  to	  the	  first	  of	  (3),	  since	  time	  cannot	  be	  saved	  it	  must	  necessarily	  be	  
spent	  in	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  js	  activities;	  the	  second	  of	  (3)	  sets	  the	  budget	  constraint	  by	  
allowing	  the	  individual	  to	  change	  her	  wealth	  level	  according	  to	  a	  possible	  discrepancy	  
between	  total	  earnings	  and	  total	  expenditure	  on	  market	  goods.	  
In	   order	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   possibility	   that	   work	   be	   also	   pleasant	   to	   a	  
certain	  extent,	  Nisticò	  (2010)	  provides	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  basic	  model,	  wherein	  total	  
time	  spent	  in	  each	  activity	  j,	  including	  work,	  is	  expressed	  as:	  
( )j j j jT e p T= + ⋅ 	  
where	   je 	  and	   p j 	  and	  	  represent,	  respectively,	  the	  unpleasant	  and	  pleasant	  shares	  of	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where	   Le 	  represents	  	  the	  unpleasant	  share	  of	  the	  time	  devoted	  to	  work.	  On	  the	  other	  













⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∑ . 
Notice	  that	   1Le < 	   reduces	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  working	  time	  necessary	  to	  buy	  the	  market	  
goods	  used	  up	  during	  activity	  j,	  thus	  highlighting	  the	  impact	  of	  work	  satisfaction	  on	  all	  
rates	  of	  return	  (5).	  
4 The	  optimum	  allocation	  of	  time	  ‘through	  weeks’	  
One	  can	  assume	  that	  the	  continuous	  flow	  of	  time	  be	  divided	  into	  ‘units’	  (say	  a	  
minute)	  and	  ‘periods’	   (say	  a	  week);	  and	  that	  each	  household	  faces	  a	  first	  problem	  of	  
allocating	  time	  among	  the	  various	  possible	  activities	  within	  a	  period.	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If	   we	   consider	   working	   time	   as	   fixed	   in	   length,	   we	   can	   interpret	   individual	  
choices	   as	   aiming	   at	   maximizing	   the	   intra-­‐period	   overall	   rate	   of	   return	   (R)	   on	   all	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,	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
which	  postulates	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  marginal	  rates	  of	  return	  on	  all	  activities.	  
However,	   each	   household	   normally	   acts	   also	  with	   reference	   to	   a	   longer	   time	  
horizon.	  For	   instance,	  Mary	  could	  take	  the	   intertemporal	   (or	  across-­‐periods)	  decision	  
to	   a	   series	   of	   tennis	   lectures,	   which	   implies	   a	   sort	   of	   commitment	   about	   how	   to	  
allocate	  her	   time	   in	   the	   forthcoming	  weeks	  of	  her	   life.	  Moreover,	   insofar	  as	   she	  will	  
actually	  enforce	  her	  initial	  decision,	  and	  she	  becomes	  a	  skilled	  tennis	  player	  capable	  to	  
enjoy	  the	  pleasure	  of	  improving	  on	  new	  types	  of	  shots,	  the	  weekly	  rate	  of	  return	  that	  
Mary	   will	   experience	   during	   the	   ‘going-­‐to-­‐play-­‐tennis’	   activity	   might	   increase	   in	   the	  
following	  weeks,4	  possibly	  providing	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  allocate,	  recurrently,	  a	  grater	  
share	  of	  her	  weekly	  time	  to	  enjoying	  the	  pleasure	  of	  playing	  tennis.	  
By	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   possible,	   unpleasant	   frustration	   characterizing	  
almost	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  first	  lessons	  of	  a	  tennis	  course,	  when	  the	  attendant	  does	  not	  
even	   hit	   the	   ball	   with	   the	   racket	   but,	   nevertheless,	   she	   keeps	   attending	   the	   course	  
looking	   forward	   to	   the	   moment	   when	   she	   will,	   we	   could	   refer	   to	   ‘consumption’	   or	  
‘investment’	  activities	  according	  to	  the	  shortness	  of	  the	  ‘gestation’	  period	  required	  for	  
the	  output	  to	  show	  up.	  More	  roundabout	   techniques	  extend	  across	  multiple	  periods,	  
and	  normally	  imply	  giving	  up	  present	  satisfaction	  in	  exchange	  of	  a	  greater	  capacity	  to	  
produce	  satisfaction	  in	  the	  forthcoming	  periods.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Note	  that	  in	  this	  example,	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  is	  due	  both	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  
share	  of	  pleasant	  time	  enjoyed	  while	  playing	  tennis	  and	  to	  the	  fall	  in	  the	  expenditure	  on	  market	  services	  
(the	  cost	  of	  the	  lessons).	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In	   line	   with	   Marshall’s	   distinction	   between	   a	   short	   and	   a	   long	   run,	   we	   can	  
assume	   that,	   in	   each	   period,	   choices	   are	   constrained	   by	   a	   series	   of	   elements	   that	  
determine	  what	  we	  might	  call	  the	  ‘satisfaction	  productive	  capacity’	  of	  the	  household.	  
In	  fact,	  a	  series	  of	  elements,	  such	  as	  the	  type	  of	   job	  we	  derive	  our	   income	  from,	  the	  
degree	   of	   flexibility	   of	   the	   housing	   market,	   the	   family	   ties	   and	   other	   important	  
constraints	  set	  a	  limit	  to	  our	  capability	  to	  reshuffle	  our	  weekly	  time	  allocation	  in	  order	  
to	  produce	   ‘more	  satisfaction’	   in	   the	  short	   run,	   the	  distribution	  of	  our	   time	  between	  
alternative	  types	  of	  activities	  in	  each	  period	  (Marshall’s	  short	  run)	  being	  quite	  rigid.	  We	  
can	  easily	  decide	  for	  a	  concert	  or	  for	  a	  movie	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  visit	  a	  museum	  next	  
Saturday,	  but	  we	  can	  hardly	  decide	  for	  more	  entertainment	  and	  less	  work	  this	  week.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   individuals	   often	   engage	   in	   activities	   whose	   effects	   will	  
show	  up	  only	  in	  subsequent	  periods.	  Mary	  could	  engage	  in	  a	  time-­‐consuming	  activity,	  
such	   as	   acquiring	   new	   skills	   and	   searching	   for	   a	   new	   job	   -­‐	   characterized	   by	   higher	  
earnings	  and	  less,	  more	  flexible,	  weekly	  working	  hours.	  Such	  a	  reshuffling	  might	  be	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  Mary’s	  (satisfaction)	  productive	  capacity	  to	  be	  actually	  utilized	  
in	  the	  forthcoming	  weeks	  of	  her	  life.	  	  
4.1 Expectations	  and	  the	  passage	  of	  ‘weeks’	  
Suppose	  that	  an	  individual	  has	  found	  her	  way	  to	  a	  satisfying	  plan	  about	  how	  to	  
distribute	  her	  time	  among	  the	  j	  activities	  with	  the	  expected	  marginal	  rates	  of	  return	  on	  
all	   activities	   all	   equal	   to	   each	   other.	   As	   the	   second	   of	   Gossen’s	   laws	   of	   pleasure	  
suggests,	   the	   possible	   repetition	   through	   time	   of	   the	   same	   set	   of	   activities	   will	  
normally	   decrease	   the	   rate	   of	   return	   for	   most	   of	   them,	   thus	   leading	   to	   a	   sort	   of	  
‘boredom	  state	  of	  rest’	  that	  can	  be	  broken	  only	  by	  some	  innovative	  behaviour,	  such	  as	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  consumption	  skills.	  Here,	  Schumpeter’s	  notion	  of	  entrepreneurship	  
as	  some	  one	  capable	  to	   ‘break’	  the	  competitive	  equilibrium,	  characterized	  by	  a	  zero-­‐
profits	   allocation	   of	   the	   productive	   capacity,	   which	   here	   has	   its	   analogous	   in	   the	  
boredom	   state	   of	   rest	   characterized	   by	    r j ≤ 0 ∀j 	   should	   probably	   be	   resumed	   by	  
focusing	  on	  the	  process	  of	  innovations	  in	  consumption.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   some	   other	   activities	   might	   reveal	   to	   be	   investment	  
activities	   in	  themselves	  in	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  enjoyed	  while	  performing	  them	  will	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increase	  period	  after	  period.	  In	  fact,	  for	  some	  activities,	  such	  as	  listening	  to	  music,	  it	  is	  
the	  same	  activity	  that	  implies	  increasing	  the	  satisfaction	  productive	  capacity.	  	  
One	   can	   therefore	   distinguish	   between	   those	   activities,	   Scitovsky’s	   unskilled	  
activities,	   for	   which	   their	   repetition	   in	   the	   current	   period	   can	   at	   best,	   though	   with	  
certainty,	  ensure	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  same	  pleasure	  already	  experienced	  in	  the	  past,	  
so	  that	  	  
(8)	   ≤
t t -­‐1j j
p p ;	  
and	   those	   activities,	   Scitovsky’s	   skilled	   ones,	   for	   which	   the	   sign	   of	   (8)	   could	   be	  
reversed5,	  though	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty.	  
4.2 The	  attractiveness	  of	  comfort	  
Similarly	  to	  what	  happens	  in	  any	  productive	  process,	  the	  share	  of	  pleasant	  time	  
enjoyed	   during	   any	   activity	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   function	   of	   the	   market	   goods	  
necessary	  to	  perform	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  
(9)	  
 !
pj = f j g1j ,g2j…,gzj( ) .	  
After	  deciding	   the	   type	  and	  variety	  of	  market	  goods	  necessary	   to	  perform	  an	  
activity,	  we	  could	  still	  decide	  to	  increase	  our	  expenditure	  on	  those	  inputs.	  For	  instance,	  
a	   tennis	   player	   -­‐	  who	  owns	   the	  essential	   inputs	   such	   as	   an	  ordinary	   racket,	   used	  up	  
shoes	   and	   balls,	   and	   is	   accustomed	   to	   play	   on	   a	   cheap-­‐to-­‐rent	   court	   located	   in	   the	  
middle	  of	  a	  parking	  place	  –	  might	  decide	  to	  start	  renting	  a	  more	  expensive	  court	  nicely	  
located	   far	   from	   the	   traffic	  noise	  and	   shadowed	  by	  beautiful	   trees.	  By	   taking	   such	  a	  
choice,	  besides	   the	  pleasurable	   time	  units	  enjoyed	  while	   trying	   to	  mark	  good	  points,	  
the	  player	  could	  enjoy	  also	  the	  time	  units	  spent	  on	  collecting	  the	  balls	  spread	  around	  
the	  court	  before	  starting	  a	  new	  game.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  share	  of	  pleasurable	  time	  
felt	  during	  the	  ‘tennis	  activity’	  could	  increase.	  	  
One	  can	  therefore	  assume	  that	  for	  all	  activities	  the	  following	  condition	  for	  the	  
partial	  derivative	  of	  (9)	  holds:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  distinction	  between	  comfort	  or	  defensive	  activities	  and	  creative	  one,	  was	  first	  proposed	  



















> 0 .	  
According	  to	  (11),	  the	  impact,	  given	  mi,	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  market	  
goods	   used	   up	   during	   any	   activity	   j	   on	   the	   rate	   of	   return	   of	   that	   same	   activity	   is	  
positive,	   given	   that	   it	   can	   be	   expressed	   as	   the	   product	   of	   two	   positive	   partial	  
derivatives,	   namely	   that	   of	   the	   rate	   of	   return	   of	   activity	   j	  with	   respect	   to	   degree	   of	  
pleasantness	  of	  the	  same	  activity	  and	  that	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  pleasantness	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  expense	  on	  market	  goods,	  which	  is	  positive	  according	  to	  (10).	  	  
This	   overlooked	   circumstance	   gives	   a	   highly	   rational	   foundation	   to	   the	  
phenomenon	  of	  conspicuous	  consumption	  as	  a	  way	  to	  escape	  from	  boredom,	  or	  even	  
from	   the	   negative	   pleasure	   felt	   during	   working	   time	   or,	   finally,	   as	   a	   way	   to	   avoid	  
complex	  reshuffling	  of	  one’s	  time	  allocation,	  whose	  outcome	  is	  uncertain,	   in	  the	  face	  
of	  recurrent	  increases	  in	  income.	  
Notice	  that	  a	  similar	  rationale	  can	  be	  found	  for	  ‘idleness’	  (such	  as	  watching	  TV)	  
when	  increasing	  productivity	  makes	  more	  time	  rather	  than	  more	   income	  available	  to	  
the	  individual.	  	  
5 Contrasting	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   average	   return	   of	   consumption	  
activities:	  the	  possible	  role	  of	  culture	  
Scitovsky’s	  attempt	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  choice	  that	  breaks	  
the	  boundaries	  between	  economics	  and	  psychology	  includes	  the	  idea	  that	  time	  use	  is	  
one	   of	   those	   aspects	   of	   everyday	   life	   in	   which	   individual	   behaviour	   ‘reveal’	   rather	  
paradoxical	  choices,	  which	  call	  for	  a	  notion	  of	  rationality	  different	  from	  the	  traditional	  
one.	   In	   particular,	  where	  Becker	   sees	   the	   validation	  of	   his	   approach	   –	  when	   income	  
rises	  individual	  save	  on	  highly	  time-­‐consuming	  activities	  –	  Scitovsky	  sees	  a	  tendency	  to	  
allocate	  inefficiently	  the	  available	  time:	  
“higher	   earnings	   create	   a	   feeling	   that	   time	   is	   getting	   more	   precious,	   …	   this	  
feeling	  in	  turn	  cause	  people	  to	  save	  more	  time	  than	  they	  know	  how	  to	  spend.	  If	  this	  is	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so,	   it	  will	  manifest	   itself	   in	   people’s	   hurrying	   through	   some	   activities	   only	   to	   be	   left	  
with	  more	  than	  enough	  time	  to	  waste	  on	  others	  …”	  (Scitovsky,	  1974)	  
Yet	  Scitovsky	   is	  well	  aware	  of	   the	   risk	   that	  his	   ‘wasting	   time’	  argument	  might	  
imply	  some	  paternalistic	  attitude	  and	  an	  inclination	  to	  separate	  the	  set	  of	  consumption	  
activities	   into	   two	   subsets	   the	   ‘good’	   and	   ‘bad’	   ones	   and	   tries	   (not	   without	   some	  
failures)	  to	  escape	  from	  the	  trap:	  
…Time-­‐budget	   surveys	   and	   various	   sociological	   studies	   tell	   us	   that	   the	   main	  
sources	  of	  stimulation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  watching	  television,	  driving	  for	  pleasure	  
and	  shopping	  –	  all	  of	  which	  are	  sources	  of	   stimulation	   requiring	  no	  skill.	  Why	  do	  we	  
find	  them	  less	  stimulating	  and	  satisfying	  than	  listening	  to	  music	  or	  reading	  literature?	  
They	  are	  not	  less	  so,	  not	  as	  long	  as	  they	  provide	  a	  flow	  of	  information	  commensurate	  
with	   our	   requirements	   for	   pleasant	   stimulation.	   Television,	   driving	   around,	   and	  
shopping	   can	   all	   be	   very	   stimulating,	   up	   to	   a	   point.	   Many	   television	   programs	   are	  
enjoyable	  and	  interesting;	  going	  to	  a	  colourful	  market	  or	  shopping	  center,	  …	  looking	  at	  
the	   latest	   fashions	   in	   elegant	   department	   stores	   or	   inspecting	  next	   year’s	  models	   of	  
automobiles	  can	  all	  be	  fun.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  driving	  …	  Yet	  the	  flow	  of	  novelty	  and	  
stimulation	   available	   from	   those	   three	   sources	   is	   limited.	   What	   we	   get	   out	   of	   TV,	  
shopping	   and	   driving	   is	   fully	   adequate	   for	   pleasant,	   sometimes	   even	   maximally	  
pleasant	   stimulation	   when	   the	   time	   devoted	   to	   their	   enjoyment	   is	   suitably	   limited,	  
spaced	  and	  selected,	  but	  it	  quickly	  becomes	  redundant,	  unsurprising,	  and	  monotonous	  
as	  we	  devote	  more	  time	  to	  them	  in	  the	  vain	  hope	  that	  our	  intake	  of	  novelty	  will	  keep	  
step	  with	  the	  increased	  time	  we	  spend	  on	  them”	  (JE,	  p.233)	  
For	  what	  concerns,	   cultural	  activities	   in	  particular,	  according	   to	  Scitovsky,	   the	  
industrial	  revolution	  has	  forced	  low-­‐income	  people	  to	  longer	  working	  hours	  and	  hence	  
to	   abandon	   cultural	   activities.	   However,	   the	   subsequent	   increase	   in	   income	   and	  
productivity	  and	  the	  parallel	  reduction	  of	  working	  time	  has	  not	  produced	  the	  result	  of	  
an	   increase	   in	   the	   demand	   for	   cultural	   activities.	   According	   to	   Scitovsky,	   lost	   skills	  
haven’t	   been	   restored	   and	   one	   should	   question	   why	   human	   beings	   urge	   for	   being	  
active	   is	  either	   frustrated	  by	  an	  excessive	  pursuit	  of	  comfort	  activities	  or	  satisfied	  by	  
engaging	  in	  the	  malign	  ones.	  	  
Whereas	  Scitovsky’s	  main	  answer	   is	  American	  Puritan	  Ethic	  and	  the	  schooling	  
system,	   the	  next	   section	  of	   this	  paper	   tries	   to	  give	  a	  different	  answer	   to	   ‘Scitovsky’s	  
problem’	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  ‘what	  shall	   I	  do’	  framework	  presented	  in	  sections	  (2)	  and	  
(3)	  above.	  
If	  one	  starts	   from	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	   ‘natural’	   tendency	  towards	  a	  boredom	  
state	  of	  rest,	  one	  should	  first	  tries	  to	  ‘understand	  and	  explain’	  what	  are	  the	  reasonable	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reactions	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  ‘then’	  identify	  the	  right	  incentives	  to	  guide	  individuals	  
towards	  a	  more	  desirable	  (if	  any)	  time	  allocation	  from	  society’s	  viewpoint.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  one	  should	  admit	  that,	  within	  each	  week:	  
§ technical	  progress	  allows	  a	  more	  efficient	  use,	  and	  hence	  a	  greater	  rate	  
of	  return,	  of	  our	  time	  devoted	  to	  ‘defensive	  activities’;	  
§ Idleness,	   (e.g.	   watching	   non-­‐stimulating	   TV	   channels)	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
time	  spent	  in	  residual	  activities	  especially	  after	  a	  long-­‐lasting	  unpleasant	  activity,	  such	  
as	  a	  tiring	  day’s	  work,	  can	  be	  very	  attractive	  since	  it	  increases	  with	  certainty	  the	  overall	  
weekly	  rate	  of	  return	  (6);6	  
§ A	  similar	  rise	  in	  (6),	  through	  (10),	  takes	  place	  if	  a	  possible	  increase	  in	  the	  
individual’s	   income,	   or	   the	   availability	   of	   accumulated	   wealth,	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	  
consume	  more	  and	  newer	  market	  goods	  during	  the	  various	  activities,	  especially	  if	  the	  
‘defensive’	   goods	   become	   ‘creative’	   and	   previously	   instrumental	   activities,	   such	   as	  
cooking,	  become	  pleasant	  and	  self-­‐rewarding;	  	  
§ the	   output	   of	   the	   defensive	   activities	   is	   predictable	   and	   requires	   no	  
skills,	   whereas	   that	   of	   self-­‐rewarding	   (cultural)	   activities	   requires	   investment,	  
‘roundaboutness’	  whose	  present-­‐period	  rate	  of	  return	  is	  generally	  negative,	  while	  the	  
potentially	  higher	  future	  period	  rates	  of	  return	  are	  uncertain	  or	  even	  ‘invisible’.	  
5.1 The	  demand	  for	  cultural	  activities	  as	  an	  investment	  project	  
Therefore,	   the	   demand	   for	   cultural	   activities	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   dictated	   by	   an	  
exogenous	  will	  (Keynes’s	  animal	  spirits)	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  roundabout	  techniques	  for	  
the	  production	  of	  future	  pleasant	  time.	  Here	  Scitovsky’s	  notion	  of	  ‘redundancy’	  seems	  
to	  be	  particularly	  insightful.	  Cultural	  activities	  can	  be	  enjoyable	  insofar	  as	  they,	  first	  of	  
all,	   ‘fill’	   our	   existing	   productive	   capacity	   of	   pleasant	   time	   in	   cultural	   activities	   and,	  
second,	   expose	   us	   to	   a	  moderate	   degree	   of	   novelty	   and	   hence	   of	   excitement.	   	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  “…The	  switch	  from	  radio	  to	  TV	  is	  obviously	  explained	  by	  technical	  progress,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  
other	  changes	  go	  from	  planned	  and	  structured	  activities	  to	  unplanned,	  unstructured,	  residual	  ones,	  and	  
they	   are	   the	   sorts	   of	   changes	   one	  would	   expect	   to	   occur	   when	   the	   high	   cost	   of	   time	  makes	   people	  
anxious	  to	  save	  it,	  leaving	  them	  with	  more	  time	  on	  their	  hands	  than	  they	  know	  what	  to	  do	  with”	  …	  It	  is	  
natural	  to	  save	  time	  on	  activities	  that	  have	  to	  be	  decided	  upon,	  prepared	  for,	  or	  planned	  in	  advance;	  it	  is	  
also	  natural	   to	  waste	  time	  on	  those	  one	  can	  take	  up	  at	  a	  moment’s	  notice,	   linger	  over	  at	  will,	  or	  drift	  
into	  unwittingly	  (JE,	  pp.163-­‐64)	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following	  quote	  from	  Chapter	  eleven	  of	  the	  JE	  (Our	  disdain	  for	  Culture)	  makes	  it	  clear	  
why	  culture	  should	  be	  associated	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  investment:	  
“In	  Chapter	  Three	  I	  dealt	  at	  length	  with	  novelty	  as	  a	  source	  of	  stimulus	  and	  an	  
intermediate	  degree	  of	  novelty	  as	  the	  condition	  that	  makes	  stimulus	  enjoyable.	  There	  
we	  looked	  upon	  redundancy	  as	  something	  the	  stimulus	  source	  must	  provide	  in	  order	  
to	  make	   the	   stimulus	   pleasant.	   But	   redundancy	   can	   just	   as	   well	   be	   looked	   upon	   as	  
something	  the	  recipient’s	  mind	  must	  contain	  if	  he	  is	  to	  enjoy	  the	  stimulus.	  We	  shall	  see	  
that	  redundancy	  as	  a	  requirement	  in	  the	  recipient	  suggests	  a	  definition	  of	  culture	  …	  I	  
shall	   define	   culture	   as	   knowledge;	   it	   is	   that	   part	   of	   knowledge	   which	   provides	   the	  
redundancy	  needed	  to	  render	  stimulation	  enjoyable.	  (pp.	  224-­‐5)	  
Curiously	  enough,	  Scitovsky	  came	  close	  to	  identify	  the	  notion	  of	  rate	  of	  return	  
in	  consumption:	  
Going	   to	   school	   to	   acquire	   a	   skill,	   whether	   the	   process	   itself	   is	   pleasant	   or	  
unpleasant,	   is	  an	  investment	  which	  yields	  a	  return	  –	  additional	   income	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
production	   skills,	   the	   better	   enjoyment	   of	   life	   in	   the	   case	   of	   consumption	   skills.	  
Estimates	  of	   the	   rate	  of	   return	  on	   investment	   in	  professional	  and	  vocational	   training	  
can	   be	  made	   and	   are	   available;	   nothing	   even	   remotely	   comparable	   is	   possible	   with	  
respect	  to	  consumption	  skills.	  One	  cannot	  attach	  a	  dollar	  value	  to	  the	  skill	  of	  enjoying	  a	  
concert	  or	  a	  ballet,	  even	   less	  can	  one	  estimate	  the	  time	  needed	  for	  or	  the	  chance	  of	  
ever	   turning	   a	   neophyte	   into	   an	   enthusiastic	   melomane	   or	   balletomane	   through	  
training	   and	   practice.	  With	   so	  many	   unknowns	   so	   utterly	   impossible	   to	   estimate,	   it	  
seems	   rational,	   at	   least	   on	   a	   narrow	   interpretation	   of	   the	   term,	   to	   discount	   the	  
benefits	  heavily	  …	  (ibidem	  p.229)	  
If	   culture	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   ‘productive	   capacity’,	   it	   should	  be	   intended	  as	   the	   result	   of	   an	  
investment;	   then	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   ask	  how	  one	   (the	  policy	  maker)	   can	   foster	   it.	   Is	  
there	  something	  we	  can	  learn	  from	  the	  economic	  theory	  of	   investment	  in	  productive	  
capacity?	   From	   macro-­‐theory,	   we	   know	   for	   instance	   that	   investment	   depends	   on	  
expectations,	   on	   its	   opportunity	   cost	   (the	   interest	   rate)	   and,	   according	   to	   the	  
accelerator	  theory	  to	  previous	   investment	  and	  that,	  therefore,	  some	  policy	  measures	  
(such	  as	  keeping	   its	  opportunity	  cost	   low	  enough)	  can	  sustain	   it.	  Does	  all	   this	  help	   in	  
indentifying	  some	  kind	  of	  incentive	  to	  induce	  individuals	  to	  invest	  more	  in	  culture?	  	  
Diversification	  of	  cultural	  products	  with	  different	  degrees	  of	  ‘redundancy’	  and	  hence	  of	  
novelty	  seems	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  attract	   individuals,	  otherwise	  attracted	  by	  idleness	  
and	   or	   conspicuous	   consumption	   (comfort)	   as	   effective	   ways	   to	   counteract	   the	  
tendency	  towards	  a	  boredom-­‐state-­‐of	  rest.	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5.2 Labour	  supply	  
In	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  ideal	  of	  a	  stationary	  state	  
“society	  would	  exhibit	  these	  leading	  features:	  a	  well-­‐paid	  and	  affluent	  body	  of	  
labourers;	  no	  enormous	  fortunes,	  except	  what	  were	  earned	  and	  accumulated	  during	  a	  
single	   lifetime;	  but	   a	  much	   larger	  body	  of	  persons	   than	  at	  present,	   not	  only	  exempt	  
from	   the	   coarser	   toils,	   but	   with	   sufficient	   leisure,	   both	   physical	   and	   mental,	   from	  
mechanical	  details,	  to	  cultivate	  freely	  the	  graces	  of	   life,	  and	  afford	  examples	  of	  them	  
to	  the	  classes	  less	  favourably	  circumstanced	  for	  their	  growth”	  (Mill	  1848,	  Book	  IV,	  Ch.	  
6).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Keynes	  envisaged	  for	  us,	  ‘his	  grandchildren’,	  the	  difficulty	  to	  
find	  a	  good	  use,	  other	  than	  working,	  for	  our	  spare	  time,	  when	  “three	  hours	  a	  day	  [will	  
be]	  quite	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  the	  old	  Adam	  in	  most	  of	  us”.	  In	  fact:	  
for	   the	   first	   time	   since	   his	   creation	   man	   will	   be	   faced	   with	   his	   real,	   his	  
permanent	   problem-­‐how	   to	   use	   his	   freedom	   from	   pressing	   economic	   cares,	   how	   to	  
occupy	  the	  leisure,	  which	  science	  and	  compound	  interest	  will	  have	  won	  for	  him,	  to	  live	  
wisely	  and	  agreeably	  and	  well.	  The	  strenuous	  purposeful	  money-­‐makers	  may	  carry	  all	  
of	  us	  along	  with	  them	  into	  the	  lap	  of	  economic	  abundance.	  But	  it	  will	  be	  those	  peoples,	  
who	  can	  keep	  alive,	  and	  cultivate	   into	  a	   fuller	  perfection,	   the	  art	  of	   life	   itself	  and	  do	  
not	   sell	   themselves	   for	   the	  means	   of	   life,	   who	  will	   be	   able	   to	   enjoy	   the	   abundance	  
when	  it	  comes.	  
Yet	  there	  is	  no	  country	  and	  no	  people,	  I	  think,	  who	  can	  look	  forward	  to	  the	  age	  
of	   leisure	   and	  of	   abundance	  without	   a	  dread.	   For	  we	  have	  been	   trained	   too	   long	   to	  
strive	  and	  not	  to	  enjoy.	  It	  is	  a	  fearful	  problem	  for	  the	  ordinary	  person,	  with	  no	  special	  
talents,	  to	  occupy	  himself,	  especially	  if	  he	  no	  longer	  has	  roots	  in	  the	  soil	  or	  in	  custom	  
or	  in	  the	  beloved	  conventions	  of	  a	  traditional	  society.	  To	  judge	  from	  the	  behaviour	  and	  
the	  achievements	  of	  the	  wealthy	  classes	  today	  in	  any	  quarter	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  outlook	  
is	  very	  depressing!	  For	  these	  are,	  so	  to	  speak,	  our	  advance	  guard-­‐those	  who	  are	  spying	  
out	  the	  promised	  land	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  and	  pitching	  their	  camp	  there.	  (Keynes,	  1930).	  
Both	  Mill’s	  and	  Keynes’s	  viewpoints	  call	   for	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  labour	  supply	  
can	   be	   analyzed	   in	   a	   ‘what-­‐shall-­‐I-­‐do’	   framework,	   even	   if	   for	   the	   great	   majority	   of	  
individuals	   there	   is	   little	   room	   for	   an	   autonomous	   change	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   weekly	  
time	   devoted	   to	   work,	   both	   for	   those	   who	   would	   like	   to	   work	   more	   (e.g.	   the	  
unemployed)	  and	   for	   those	  who	  would	   like	   to	  work	   less.	  This	   is	  why	   the	  assumption	  
made	   above,	   according	   to	   which	   individuals	   can	   increase	   their	   weekly	   amount	   of	  
pleasure	  only	  by	  reallocating	  time	  among	  all	  activities	  other	  than	  work,	  is	  sensible.	  	  
However,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  generality,	  one	  can	  admit	  that	  working	  time	  is	  flexible	  
and	   that	   the	   individual	   can	   choose	   its	   ‘optimum’	   amount	  TL,	   together	  with	   all	  Tis	   in	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order	  to	  maximize	  (6).	  Within	  the	  standard	  theory,	  leisure	  time	  –	  a	  sort	  of	  empty	  box,	  
whose	  opportunity	  cost	  is	  the	  wage	  rate	  -­‐is	  the	  only	  alternative	  to	  working-­‐time	  (and	  
the	  shape	  of	  the	  labour	  supply	  function	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  weights	  of	  the	  income	  
and	  substitution	  effects	  generated	  by	  a	  change	   in	   the	  wage	   rate.	  Within	   the	  present	  
framework	   of	   analysis,	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   labor	   supply	   function,	   i.e.	   the	   sign	   of	   the	  
partial	  derivative	   ∂ ∂LT w ,	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  three	  possible	  reactions	  
of	  the	  individual	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  wage	  rate:	  
§ 1.	  Increasing	  working	  time	  ( 0∂ ∂ >LT w ):	  allows,	  through	  (10),	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  
return	  on	  one	  or	  more	  activities	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  command	  on	  market	  goods	  that	  it	  
allows.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   might	   imply	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	   absolute	   amount	   of	  
pleasant	  time	  enjoyed	  since	  it	  requires	  shrinking	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  devoted	  to	  some	  
other	  activities.	  Finally,	   it	  could	  be	  induced	  by	  a	  possible	  pleasantness	  of	  the	  working	  
activity	  itself.	  
§ 2.	   Reducing	  working	   time	   ( 0∂ ∂ <LT w ):	  allows	   an	   extension	   of	   one	   or	  more	  
activities	  other	   than	  work	  and,	  hence,	  a	  possible	   increase	   in	   the	  absolute	  amount	  of	  
pleasant	   time	   enjoyed.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   according	   to	   its	   ‘elasticity’,	   it	   might	  
generate	  a	  reduction,	  still	  through	  (10),	  of	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  one	  or	  more	  activities	  
due	  to	  the	  minor	  command	  on	  market	  goods	  that	  it	  allows.	  Finally,	  it	  could	  be	  induced	  
by	  a	  striking	  unpleasantness	  of	  the	  working	  activity	  itself.	  
§ 3.	   Leaving	   working	   time	   unchanged	   ( 0∂ ∂ =LT w ):	   allows	   a	   ‘sure’	   increase,	  
through	  (10),	  of	  the	  overall	  rate	  of	  return	  (6),	  since	  it	  does	  not	  require	  any	  reallocation	  
of	   total	   time	   among	   the	   various	   activities,	   while	   allowing	   a	   greater	   command	   on	  
market	  goods	  due	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  wage	  rate.	  
The	  attractiveness	  of	  this	  latter,	  conservative,	  strategy	  is	  quite	  evident.	  	  
6 Conclusions	  
This	   paper	   has	   tried	   to	   point	   out	   that	   a	   ‘what	   shall	   I	   do’	   framework	   can	   be	  
usefully	   employed	   to	   explain	   why	   individuals	   might	   refrain	   in	   engaging	   in	   cultural	  
activities.	  Scitovsky’s	  insights	  about	  the	  meaning	  and	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  culture	  have	  
also	  been	  discussed	  by	  contrasting	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  a	  higher	  present-­‐period	  rate	  of	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return	   of	   unskilled	   activities	   with	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   a	   possibly	   higher	   future-­‐period	  
rate	  of	  return	  obtainable	  through	  engagement	  in	  (more	  roundabout)	  cultural	  activities.	  
Such	  an	  analysis	  could	  be	  further	  extended	  by	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  insights	  
coming	   from	   the	   behavioural	   literature	   on	   time	   discounting	   (see	   Frederick,	  
Loewenstein	  and	  O’Donoghue	  2002)	  that	  might	  explain	  the	  reluctance	  of	  individuals	  to	  
invest	   in	   the	   acquisition	   of	   the	   skills	   necessary	   to	   escape	   from	   boredom	   through	  
engagement	  in	  cultural	  activities.	  Moreover,	  the	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  increasing	  our	  
comfort	   through	   access	   to	   new	   market	   goods,	   the	   inputs	   of	   our	   time-­‐consuming	  
activities,	  is	  a	  viable	  alternative	  to	  a	  complex	  and	  difficult-­‐to-­‐achieve	  reshuffling	  of	  the	  
weekly	   allocation	   of	   time	   among	   the	   alternative	   activities,	   whose	   outcome	   is	   highly	  
uncertain.	  
	  	  Scitovsky’s	  notion	  of	  redundancy,	  coupled	  with	  the	  interpretation	  of	  demand	  
for	   culture	   as	   an	   investment	   activity,	   paves	   the	   way	   to	   identifying	   two	  main	   policy	  
implications.	  	  
The	   first	   one	   is	   that	   subsidies	   to	   the	   arts	   should	   ensure	   the	   availability	   of	  
stimulating	   activities	   with	   many	   different	   degrees	   of	   ‘redundancy’	   and	   hence	   of	  
novelty	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   the	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   individuals’	   possible	  
decision	   to	  engage	   in	  more	  demanding	  activities;	   scaling	  up	   is	  more	  attractive	  when	  
the	  expected	  degree	  of	  novelty,	  and	  hence	  the	  risk	  of	  failure,	  is	  small.	  	  
The	  second	  implication	  has	  to	  do	  with	  Mill’s	  and	  Keynes’s	  prophecies.	  Market	  
economies	  have	  won	  their	  intellectual	  battle	  against	  planned	  economies	  essentially	  for	  
their	   ability	   to	   provide	   individuals	   with	   a	   greater	   variety	   of	  market	   goods.	   The	   new	  
challenge	  is	  now	  that	  of	  offering	  an	  actual	  freedom	  of	  choice	  among	  activities,	  such	  as	  
learning,	   consumption,	  work	   and	   entertainment.	   In	   fact,	   the	   present	   organization	   of	  
markets	  easily	  allows	   individuals	  to	  substitute	  among	  different	  activities	  belonging	  to	  
the	  same	  set	  (for	  instance	  among	  different	  consumption	  activities	  or	  among	  different	  
entertainments).	  A	  much	  more	  difficult	  task	  is	  to	  take	  choices	  capable	  of	  determining	  a	  
reallocation	   of	   the	   lifetime	   among	   the	   four	   different	   sets	   (for	   instance	  more	   leisure	  
and	  less	  work	  during	  the	  active	  period),	  the	  allocation	  of	  our	  lifetime	  among	  the	  four	  
sets	   being	   quite	   rigid	   for	   each	   age	   group.	   Cultural	   activities	   are	   both	   highly	  
time-­‐consuming	   and	   demanding	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘satisfaction	   productive	   capacity’.	  
Individuals	   see	   their	   time	   constraint	   actually	   relaxed	   only	   at	   retirement	   when,	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however,	  it	  is	  generally	  too	  late	  to	  acquire	  the	  skills	  necessary	  to	  enjoy	  culture.	  It	  will	  
probably	   be	   the	   role	   of	   a	   new	   Welfare	   State	   to	   focus	   on	   how	   aging	   and	   affluent	  
societies	  can	  achieve	  a	  less	  rigid	  distribution	  of	  the	  time	  that	  individuals	  devote	  to	  the	  
various	  types	  of	  activities	  during	  the	  life	  cycle.	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